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INTRODUCTION 
During the spring 1996 semester, the Jepson School of Leadership Studies offered a 
special topics course titled "Leadership in Crisis." The course, co-taught by Dr. Richard 
Couto and former Virginia Attorney-General Mary-Sue Terry, intended to "offer students CPR 
instruction to sustain organizational and personal vision" (Couto) for a group or organization 
dealing with crisis. Members of the class were instructed in crisis taxonomy and 
classification, crisis in diverse contexts, crisis management plans, crisis perspectives from both 
inside and outside of organizations, and the role of the personal in dealing with crisis. The 
faculty instructors determined that although the course had many valuable components and 
would be an asset to the Leadership Studies curriculum, the course would be most useful 
broken down into elements that could be added into other courses, decision making and 
conflict resolution, for example (Couto). 
The instructors recognized the importance of the content of this course as crises 
situations hit us in many facts of life ranging from personal, to organizational, to national or 
world \.vide. It is often through these situations that leaders emerge in our societies and lives 
to lead us through these experiences Thus, this leadership environment as Dr. Couto and 
Professor Terry realized, is important to the field of leadership studies as from many of these 
situations emerge the leaders of our generations. 
Personal experiences in the crisis course awakened this realization of the importance of 
crisis research as well as a desire to impact this field of study. This desire met fruition in the 
fall of 1996 with the discussion of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies senior thesis. 
Because of a strong interest in the material from the Leadership in Crisis course, an initinl 
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proposal was created proposing the redesign of the course curriculum for this class. However, 
because of numerous ideas, and specific concerns about the course's existing curriculum, one 
facet of the material had to be chosen. Under recommendation of Dr. Couto, the decision 
was made to extend the work of Michael Helsel, a classmate from the Leadership in Crisis 
course. Michael's work involved a paper with a model that measured crisis magnitude. 
Specifically, the index measured the actual/potential number of persons affected by a 
circumstance to the degree of actual or potential negativity of the same situation. Intrigued 
by the model, it was decided that an investigation into model's accuracy and implications 
allowed thorough investigation of crisis research and granted an opportunity to contribute to 
this field of study. Finally, this investigation allows personal development and understanding 
of a phenomenon that proliferates today's world, the world from which our leaders emerge. 
LlTF.RATllRE REVIEW 
In order to understand the scope of the Helsel model, that is, understand the model's 
limitations and the range of its use, an effort must be made to understand the context in 
which the model was developed: crisis. This would invoke the determination of the nature 
of crisis and the components of this phenomenon. This investigation will address these two 
questions with the hope of establishing a framework for defining crisis and assumptions which 
may be applied to the .. Scale of Crisis Magnitude" 
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What is cr·isis? 
In an electronic dictionary search. Miriam-Wesbster's Collegiate Dictionai:y identified 
three items relevant to the requested query, crisis. The reference defined a crisis, an identity 
crisis, and a midlife crisis. Within the range of the crisis definition, Miriam-Webster 
identifies three different contexts of the word, a physiological usage, an environmental usage, 
and a point usage (i.e. a point of juncture). Although each of these contexts and definitions 
have commonalities in representing crisis as a turning point or decisive moment, this example 
from a common reference source demonstrates on a small scale, the complexity of defining a 
crisis. 
Thomas Kuhn and Patrick Lagadec suggest that in general, crisis is characterized by a 
disturbance of a normal course of events or specifically a "technical breakdown of a normal 
process" (Kuhn 69). Jack Gottschalk also recognizes this deviance from the norm in a 
business context. He states. " In business, a crisis is a situation that, left unaddressed, will 
jeopardize the organization's ability to do business normally. The term is used frequently to 
describe everything from a nagging problem to a busy day" (Gottschalk 397). Lagadec takes 
this concept one step further,r addressing the idea Gottschalk acknowledges: that the term 
crisis is becoming a ready-to-use catch-phrase for all problematic situations ( Lagadec 25). 
He points out that a deviation from the norm only becomes a crisis once the deviation has 
passed a certain limit or an accident occurs in a system that was already unstable or close to a 
breaking point. when the event occurred. This limit thus recognizes a differentiation between 
normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis (Lagadec 3 ). Lagadec clarifies the difference 
between conventional incidents and crisis by characterizing conventional incidents as: 
-A welJ understood event. of limited scale
-Clearly defined emergency procedures
-A limited number of actors
-The organizations involved know one another
-Clear cut roles and responsibilities
-A well acknowledged authority structure
-A situation that is perceived to be manageable
-A breakdown that is quickly brought under control
In contrast to these characteristics, Lagadec also notes factors that characterize a crisis 
situation. These factors include: 
-A large scale breakdown
-A very destabilizing type of breakdown
-Grave situations that degrade exponentially
-Emergencies that do not play by the rules
-Unknowns
-A growing number of authorities involved
-Critical communications problems
-Huge stakes
-Tl,e issue of time
These distinguishing elements thus make it possible, at a basic level, to distinguish between 
normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis. 
The idea that a problem can be distinguished from a crisis brings us back to the 
original complexity of defining crisis. This concept will now be examined from the 
viewpoints of context and perspective. Although the characteristics which Lagadec describes 
to distinguish between normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis are interdisciplinary, his 
work is contextually written for organizations attempting to understand and interpret crisis. 
Like Lagadec, the ideas of most individuals regarding crisis are contextual as well. Thus, 
many notions and definitions ultimately come together to form the term crisis. For example, 
Steve Albrecht states that "A business based crisis is an event specific episode that can make 
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or break you, depending upon the size of your company, the number of people you employ, 
the products and services you sell, and the resources of people, assets, and money you can 
aim at the problem" (Albrecht 7). Here, Albrecht addresses the situational properties of a 
business crisis relating that the perspective taken to handle a situation of this context is a high 
determinant in the outcome of the crisis. From a scientific viewpoint, Kuhn suggests that 
··excepting those that are exclusively instrumental, every problem that normal science sees as
a puzzle can be seen, from another viewpoint, as a counterinstance and thus as a source of 
crisis" (Kuhn 79). This idea demonstrates another contextual use of crisis, alfowing one to 
see a crisis as an instrument for loosening the rules of normal research to allow change to 
occur (80). Other definitions taking a multidiciplinary approach state that ... crisis is an aspect 
of transformation" (Capra 26), it is .. a warning that a turning point is near .. (Holusha 5), or it 
is .. an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending- either one 
with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome or one with the distinct 
possibility of a highly desirable and extremely positive outcome'' (Fink 15). These 
viewpoints of crisis demonstrate a spectrum of crisis definition grounded on different contexts 
and field perspectives. So, beyond identifying a crisis based on its escalation from a 
conventional incident, which is itself dependent upon the interpretation of the individuals 
involved, it is difficult to pen a concrete definition of a crisis. 
Lagadec again recognizes the conceptual diversity of crisis and addresses this 
complexity in his work Preventing Chaos In a Crisis. In his chapter ·'Crisis. or the loss of 
the reference framework" Lagadec identifies twelve general crisis attributes from the abyss of 
crisis definition. In addition, he recognizes crisis characteristics from other disciplines 
6 
including psychology and sociology. These definitions acknowledge characteristics of change. 
loss of control, stress and anxiety, inadequate information, and a threat to goals, often 
experienced in crisis situations. The compilation of these characteristics as well as those 
distinguishing between conventional incidents and crisis implies the difficulty and perhaps 
impossibility of setting a universal definition for the notion of crisis. Thus, the work of 
Lagadec as well as the notions expressed in each contextual definition observed above, come 
together to comprise the diverse and ma11eable term 'crisis' {Lagadec 30). 
Aside from the issue of one common universal definition for crisis, there are two 
concepts mentioned but not explored in the literature, crisis as a matter of perspective, and the 
possibilities of crisis possessing positive connotations. Several of the authors mentioned 
demonstrate through the context in which their work was authored, that the discipline in 
which a crisis is researched and defined contains both the author's personal perspective and 
also that of their field. In addition, Albrecht mentions the role of perspective in determining 
the outcome of a crisis. However, it is important to note that while these authors do not 
specifically address crisis as perspective dependent, this idea is implied in crisis literature. 
Particularly, it is suggested that the concept of crisis is relative, what may be a crisis for one 
is simply a problem for another (Lagadec 4). Lagadec addresses this idea with his 
distinguishing characteristics between conventional incidents and crisis. However, taking this 
a step further, he does not account for distinguishing between these two incidents based on 
the position of people within an organization, an organization within an environment, or a 
combination of both. For example, some confrontations escalate into crisis because groups 
have learned that the use of crisis�provoking tactics is effective in gaining management 
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attention (Lerbinger 6 ). This situation might be a crisis for the management involved, but 
only a problem for those higher up, depending upon the perspective. In addition, letting a 
crisis occur may actually be in someone's personal best interest or may be in the best interest 
of a facet opposing the entity in crisis (Dougherty 8). Thus, a crisis becomes a relative and 
highly subjective term that gains meaning through the individual needs of a person or 
organization and the environment in which they exist (Littlejohn 8). 
The ideas of a provoked crisis, or one in which a group's personal best interest are 
involved, are demonstrated in the 1971 Attica State Correctional Facility riots. The crisis at 
Attica occurred as a result of minimal response by prison authorities to inmate grievances 
regarding overcrowding problems and inadequate facilities. Although initially not intending 
to riot, the inmates became incensed though a series of events. rebelled against the authorities. 
and took the prison. Their demands in ensuing negotiation, attempted to attain positive 
outcomes for their situation, and gain the awareness and support of outside parties to their 
conditions. The crisis at Attica unfortunately ended with a hostile retake of the prison by 
authorities. However, these events are a good example of the use of crisis by a group 
attempting to achieve positive outcomes. 
Complicating the understanding of the role of perspective in defining crisis, are the 
positive and negative viewpoints of different parties involved in a crisis situation. As Fink 
mentions in his definition, a crisis may possess highly desirable or undesirable outcomes (I 5). 
This occurs as a crisis represents both dangers and opportunities depending upon the reaction 
of the people involved (Antokol 2). Thus, a characteristic of crisis is the event's ability to 
create a certain degree of risk and uncertainty (Fink 15). Whether this event is an 
unanticipated opportunity for an entity or a potential for bringing it into disrepute will be an 
interpretation of perspective by the individuals involved. In a sense then. a duality occurs in 
that a crisis will be fueled by internal energy, that is from the initial catalyst, but the reality 
of the situation itself will be related by the outside forces which impact the positive or 
negative outcome (Lagadec 21 ). 
Within a crisis, it is possible to identify differing crisis types as well as the stages 
through which a crisis progresses. Types of crisis are contextually dependent, but like 
contextual definitions have commonalities in their defining characteristics. The stages of 
crisis differ however, as phases of activity are possible to identify with a large degree of 
certain1y 
Types or C1·isis 
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In a sense, types of crisis bring this discussion back to defining what a crisis is, or to 
understanding that there are common characteristics among all crisis types (Lagadec 32-2). 
These types can be broken down into disciplines, fields, etc. based on the context in which 
the crisis occurs. In his book on avoiding chaos in crisis, Lagadec investigates commonalities 
in crisis typology characteristics in his discussion of business. corporate, and military crisis. 
Lagadec's examination includes the work of Uriel Rosenthal who suggests general guidelines 
for typing crisis including: 
-the unimaginable crisis requires that we think about what is truly unthinkable
(these are actually very rare)
-the neglected crisis.
-the quasi-una\.'<>idahh: cri.,·is occurs despite attempts at prevention.
-the compulsh•e crisis results from a sort of innate ineptitude on the part of the
relevant actors to manage the crisis (instead. through their actions these actors
help create a crisis situation) 
-the wanted crisis, desired by certain actors (such actors are not limited to
Terrorists; they may even include managers themselves)
-the wi!/1 / crisis is apparently secretly desired by all involved.(Lagadec 33)
When compared and contrasted to typologies by Lerbinger and Dougherty the characteristics 
of these guidelines make allowances for the simplistic aspects of almost any approach. To 
explain, Lerbinger defines four types of crisis: 
-Technological crisis - caused by human error or unforeseen side effects in the
equipment and processes designed to produce goods and services
-Confrontational crisis - actions of government or social action groups that
oppose organization policies and behaviors or its employees
-Crisis of malevolence - individual or groups with criminal intent or
malevolence toward the organization
-Crisis of managerial failure - ineptitude, negligence, callousness, or
misconduct (6)
These categories incorporate into Rosenthal's typology based on each category's defining 
characteristics. A technical crisis would be a quasi•unavoidable crisis, a confrontational crisis 
would fall under a wanted or wilful crisis, a crisis of malevolence would type as a wanted 
crisis, and a crisis of managerial failure would type as neglected crisis or a quasi-unavoidable 
crisis. Similarly, Dougherty suggests two categories of potential crisis, those that can be 
averted and those which can not be averted. This dichotomy divides Rosenthal's guidelines 
but successfully incorporates Dougherty's ideology. 
A specific typology for universally characterizing crisis is difficult to accomplish 
because of the diversity and multidisciplinary nature of crisis and will not be utilized within 
the scope of this investigation. Instead, it is possible to create guidelines for classification 
which base on characteristics of the event 
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Stages of Crisis 
The stages of a crisis are possibly one of the more concrete aspects of the concept 
itself. This certainty results from the ability to identify the beginning stages or catalytic 
events of a crisis, a period of dealing with or experiencing a crisis, as well as the conclusion 
or resolution of the situation. Research shows a strong agreement within this path of 
thinking. In the works of Holusha and Fink both a precrisis stage and a conclusion to the 
event are identified.However, although these authors possess similarities of thought, 
differences are observed in the development of Holusha's model of stages compared to that of 
Fink. 
Holusha identifies three stages of crisis, the precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis dimensions 
which he identifies on a pain curve [Figure I] (Holusha 16). He explains the precrisis stage 
as a time of uncertainty marked by the characteristics of nonperformance, denial, and fear or 
anger. This period of crisis is not normally seen by the outside world, but a situation is 
recognized by invested parties ( 14). A crisis period follows precrisis. This time frame is 
characterized by the event itself as well as a type of failure and panic as the climax of the 
event occurs ( 19). Finally, the end approaches with a post crisis period. This phase consists 
of shock and uncertainty from the proceeding events, but ultimately results in a radical change 
of some sort (21 ). This model evaluates the development of the average crisis situation. 
However, it perceives a crisis as a negative event, expressing ideas of failure. 
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Similar to Holusha, Fink examines stages of a crisis, but evaluates the activity 111 a 
different manner. He sees a crisis as having four distinct phases rather than three: 
-Prodromal crisis stage: precrisis/warning stage
-Acute crisis stage: the point at which some damage has been done (shortest stage)
-Chronic crisis stage: clean-up/post-mortem, time for analysis, recovery (this
stage can be indefinite)
-Crisis resolution stage: fourth and final stage - everything is well again (Fink 20)
The stages Fink describes compare to Holusha excepting the viewpoint which Fink's phases 
suggest and the addition of the last phase, crisis resolution. Fink's prodromal stage is 
compatible to Holusha's precrisis. The acute stage compares to the crisis stage. Discrepancy 
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occurs between these two frameworks though. as Fink breaks Holusha's postcrisis into a 
chronic crisis and crisis resolution stage. The question arises though as to whether Fink's 
crisis resolution stage is just a signal to the end of crisis or if this stage actually holds 
significance in the event itself. The merit of Fink's phases in comparison to those of Holusha 
is that Fink's phases make no implications as to the negativity of crisis. The model merely 
describes how the event progresses unlike that of Holusha. This discussion thus suggests, that 
Fink's phases take a more holistic and encompassing view of the progression of a crisis 
Conclusion and Applic:ation 
The ideas expressed in this study formulate a conceptual framework in which to view 
a crisis situation. Is the situation a normal occurrence, a conventional incident, or a crisis? 
From what perspective is the occurrence being evaluated? Through which stage of 
development is the crisis currently progressing? Within this framework it is now possible to 
evaluate the scope of .. Scale of Crisis magnitude" looking at the models limitations and 
applications for the further study of crisis. 
METHODOLOGY 
This project will explore the scope of the Helsel model of the "Scale of Crisis 
Magnitude .. within the conceptual framework of crisis. The investigation will evaluate the 
accuracy of how the model currently characterizes crises. the weaknesses in this 
characterization, and areas or possibilities for the expansion of the model. Based upon the 
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results of this analysis and the components of the conceptual framework, a new model will be 
created to facilitate the measurement of crises. 
The fundamental elements of this mvestigation are the Helsel "Scale of Crisis 
Magnitude" [Figure 2], an index plotting the actual/potential number of persons affected by a 
crisis against the degree of actual or potential negativity of the incident, and the Helsel model, 
a written explanation. Other sources include course materials from the Leadership and Crisis 
class. 
A qualitative research approach, based on literature analysis, will be used to determine 
the scope of this model. Specifically, several propositions emerge from crisis research: 
At a basic level, it is possible to distinguish between normalcy, conventional 
incidents, and crisis. 
Crisis is perspective dependent. 
Crisis has both positive and negative connotations. 
Cnsis occur in distinguishable stages. 
These propositions constitute the conceptual framework in which the Helsel scale is evaluated. 
The accuracy of the Helsel model will be determined in two ways, that of comparing 
11 to its written explanation and that of comparing its measurements against the conceptual 
framework of crisis First, the visual representation will be compared to the written 
explanation authored by the model's creator. The correlation of these two sources identifies 
the validity of this scale m its own right, that is, measuring the degree of negativity to the 
potential number of people involved. Is this model accurately measuring what it intends to? 
Second, accuracy will be measured by evaluating this scale by the conceptual framework. 
This comparison analyzes the accuracy of the ideas on which the model is based as well as 
the structure/organization itself. Understanding this model under these two sets of criteria 
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allows for weaknesses to be uncovered and areas of improvement to be noted. Using the 
results of this analysis, an attempt will be made to construct a new model for measuring crisis 
situations. 
The developmental goals of the new crisis model are simplicity and the ability to span 
the multidiciplinary facets and infinite interpretations of crisis study. This framework will be 
created under two constraints, 1) The new model will contain the elements of the conceptual 
framework of crisis and 2) it will consider noted weaknesses of the Helsel model. The model 
will be constructed with the knowledge that limitations will occur and that the scale is two­
dimensionalizing a dynamic phenomena. Nevertheless, the result should represent an advance 
in the understanding of crisis and how one might respond to it. To test the accuracy of the 
new model, a case will be applied to the scale, plotting the progression of the crisis situation 
to show the event's development and the usage of this instrument for leadership study. 
ANALYSIS 
11,e Helsel Moc/cl 
In a short essay about the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude," [Figure 2J Helsel I describe the 
model and its purpose in the classification of different crises. He exp1nins that the model, •· is 
a measure of the magnitude of a crisis in terms of the actual or potential number of persons 
involved, measured on the y-axis, and the degree of actual or potential negativity, measured 
on the x-axis." The categories (y-axis) ranging from personal, to organizational, to regional, 
to national, to international, to global, have unclear boundaries which are subjective, based on 
'The cxplam1lion of the scale of crisis magnitude wus ,iutlmrcd hy Michael Helsel in conjunclion \\ ith group 
members of the Attica project in the Leadership in Crisis course. 
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the perspectives of each individual involved in the situation/crisis. The same stipulations are 
placed on the factors of the x-axis, discomfort, failure, destruction, and death. Thus, each X 
placed on the graph with relationship to the factors on each axis, is not a specific point, but 
represents an area that extends in all directions. The semi-circular rings placed on the graph 
are labeled as types I-IV respectively. The intent of these rings is to categorize the severity 
of the crisis, moving from the inner ring outward. 
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Helsel makes four observations about crisis in relation to his model. These ideas 
describe what the model intends to portray in the continuum of Types I-IV 
A shift from an internal to an external locus of control. (suggesting with this 
terminology that the reality of the crisis becomes defined by the outside 
environment as severity increases) 
A shift from stakeholder polarization to stakeholder uniformity. (The stakeholders 
become more aligned as the severity progress versus further apart \vhen it is 
smaller) 
Increased media attention, ranging from local to international. 
An increasing difficulty resolving the crisis, while a decreasing difficulty 
diagnosing the problem or problems contributing to the crisis. (I) 
These four observations demonstrate how the severity of crisis increases in each of the four 
Type rings on the model. 
lmemal A110zrsis: Critique rd the Helsel Model 
In comparing the explanation authored by the model's inventors, with the physical 
representation, questions arise as to the usability of this scale as it is intended. In particular, 
two discrepancies appear, the inability of each y-axis category to be a factor in each of the 
four levels of severity for a crisis, and the ambiguity in the correlation of crisis severity Types 
I-IV to the fot1r categories of the degree of actual or potential negativity along the x-axis.
Helsel includes Types I-IV in his model to differentiate severity levels of crisis. 
However, it is unclear why only the categories of personal and organizational crisis can attain 
all four types of crisis severity The way the model is depicted, a regional crisis must be of 
the severity of a Type JI, III, or IV. This suggests that these situations can not be minor at a 
regional level. However, the single quadrant format of the model accommodates plotting a 
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situation based on a coordinate of discomfort and one of regional FoHowing this ideology, 
the point categorizes as a Type II crisis, although it would only be causing the region 
discomfort. National, international, and global crisis are similarly limited. International and 
national crisis are depicted as only Type III or IV. Global crisis is only categorized as Type 
IV. This discussion then suggests that Helsel draws a correlation between the number of
people affected by an incident and the severity of a crisis. This is supported by the y-axis 
categories, actual/potential number of persons affected, that are included within the rings of 
Types I-IV Thus, what Helsel implies in explanation and what he depicts visually do not 
maintain a correlation. 
The second discrepancy observed with this model is a perplexity in the connection of 
Types I-IV to the four categories along the x-axis, discomfort, failure, destruction, and death. 
The visual presentation of the model implies that these negative consequences are the degree 
of severity to be expected in the corresponding level of crisis. It is unclear though, whether 
this assumption is correct in light of the inability of the all y-axis categories to participate in 
all four x�axis categories. Thus, an analysis of the Helsel model, comparing the visual 
depiction with the written explanation yields a discrepancy in how the rings are laid out v. the 
plotting of examples based on the x and y axis. This structural analysis of the "Scale of 
Crisis Magnitude" tests the internal accuracy of the model: the correlation of the model's 
visual representation and written explanation. Also imperative to this investigation is an 
analysis of the content measure of the model against the conceptual framework established for 
CflSIS. 
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External Analysis: Application of the Conceptual Fr-amework to rhe Helsel Model 
The conceptual framework for this analysis is understood to encompass the following 
propositions: 
At a basic level, it is possible to distinguish between normalcy. conventional 
incidents, and crisis. 
Crisis is perspective dependent 
Crisis has both positive and negative connotations 
Crisis occurs in distinguishable stages. 
This analysis will consider the accuracy of the Helsel model in light of each of the 
propositions. Does the model contain these elements, are they implied, suggested? 
Proposition ff!: At a basic level, it is possible lo distinguish behYeen normak')1, conventional 
incidents, and crisis 
The first proposition tests the accuracy of the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude,. based on 
the model's distinction between normalcy, conventional incidents and crisis. The structure of 
this model portrays two different approaches to measuring crises, measuring crisis by its 
severity as accomplished by the Type I-IV rings, and measuring crisis through plotting 
coordinates of magnitude on they and x axes. The rings on the model categorize the severity 
of crisis: the categories they contain increase in severity as they move outward on the scale 
This measurement relates to proposition one, as the measurement of the rings could be related 
to the increase of situational severity as an event moves from a critical incident to a crisis. 
Specifically, a "flat tire" is placed within the first ring on the model. Depending upon 
perspective and situational factors, this event could categorize as a critical incident. Like the 
rings, the measurement by the axes suggest study of the magnitude of situations. In particular, 
this is observed in the x-axis categories; discomfort, failure, destruction, and death. The 
measurement of the x-axis correlates to proposition one as the degree of actual or potential 
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negativity increases along the continuum. The initial measurement of discomfort also holds 
potential correlation with a critical incident as this measurement only suggests a possible 
threat to a normal situation. Both measurement approaches of this model, the rings and the x­
axis, contain a correlation between a separation between conventional incidents and crisis. 
However, because this separation is implied and not well distinguished from a crisis situation 
on the Helsel model, it is concluded that the 11 Scale of Crisis Magnitude" does not 
substantially support proposition one. 
Pmpo.\·ihon 11 2: Crisis is perspective dependent 
The second proposition examines the accuracy of the Helsel model in the light of 
crisis as perspective dependent This assumption is supported by the Helsel model: in the 
model's written explanation. This description states that the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude" was 
constructed in the knowledge that the placement of each X on the graph is based on the 
perspectives of the model's user. Thus, although perspective is not depicted in the visual 
representntion of the Helsel model, perception is recognized as an accurate attribute of this 
model. 
Proposition :. 3: Crisis has hoth positfre and negative c:onnotations 
The third aspect of the framework in which to consider the Helsel model is the 
proposition that crisis has both positive and negative connotations. The "Scale of Crisis 
Magnitude" suggests that a crisis has a negative outcome. This statement bases on the label 
of the x-axis, "Degree of Actual or Potential Negativity." Although it is understood that the 
model attempts to accomplish an understanding of the situation or what might negatively 
happen as a result of circumstances based on the number of people involved, some viewpoints 
interpret crisis as positive. Thus, negative measurements of a situation limit this scale 
because they do not allow for positive situational outcomes or for changes in situation. All 
crisis do not end in failure, destruction, or death as implied by the scale. The discomfort 
factor on the x-axis grants leeway from the negative connotation of this model in that 
discomfort can be a factor of a change process or of a situation with a positive outcome. 
However, this observation is not substantiated with fact, nor is it discussed or used in a 
positive manner in the application of the Helsel model. Thus, the conclusion is drawn that 
the Helsel model only considers negative crisis situations in its measurement. 
Proposition :! -I: Crisis occurs in distinguishable stages 
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Finally. the accuracy of the Helsel model is investigated in light of crisis occurring in 
distinguishable stages. As implied by the stages of crisis, prodroma!, acute, chronic, and 
resolution, each stage has different levels of momentum and different circumstances are 
happe11ing at different times. These stages suggest the dynamic nature of the phenomenon. 
Through the rings, the Helsel model demonstrates the severity of crisis. The categories of the 
x-axis allow the examination of crisis at different levels of negative outcome, discomfort,
failure, destruction, and death. ln spite of these classifications of a crisis situation, neither the 
rings, nor the x-axis factors refer to the stages of crisis development. References are only 
made for the observation of crisis progression toward negative outcomes, with no allowances 
for the restoration to normalcy (pre-prodromal) or movement towards resolution, factors of the 
stages of crisis. Thus, the deduction is made that the Helsel scale does not consider the 
stages of crisis in its measurement of the phenomenon. 
This analysis of the Helsel "Scale of Crisis Magnitude" suggests that the Helsel model 
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does not accurately depict in the visual representation what is inferred by Helsel's own written 
explanation, nor does it take into account the criteria of the conceptual model proposed in this 
paper. It does not distinguish between normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis, the model 
does not consider both the positive and negative connotations associated with crisis situations, 
and it does not account for the distinguishable stages of crisis. The positive merit of this 
model which gives credibility to the model's accuracy, is its claim of observation of 
perspective. These findings in addition to the crisis factual framework are the backbone on 
which a new model to measure crisis is based. 
TRUDEL MODEL 
The analysis of the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude" concluded that the Helsel model, the 
visual depiction of the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude," is neither accurate nor usable. A new 
model was thus designed that is accurate and usable across contexts. [Figure 3] 
The new model measures the Center of Situational Control (CSC), y-axis, against the 
Degree/Nature of Threat, x-axis, in any given situation. The CSC derives from the ideology 
of Locus of Control (LOC) expressed in the Helsel model. Helsel uses the term LOC to 
describe the severity of a crisis situation. He describes this occurrence as happening as a shift 
is made in a situation from an internal to an external LOC, which in his model occurs as a 
situation moves though the continuum of Types I-IV [Figure 2]. However, this usage of the 
term is incorrect as the LOC is understood to imply a "self-assessment instrument to 
discriminate between people who feel their destiny is determined primarily by external 
forces ... and people who feel their destiny is largely determined by internal forces" (Curphy 
AGURE 3 
_J 
0 a: 
1-z 
0 
0 
....J 
<( z 
0 
:J 
1-­
(J) 
u. 
0 
er: 
UJ 
1-z 
UJ 
0 
External 
csc 
Internal 
CSC Threat to 
Normalcy/Stasis 
[Conventional Incident] 
DEGREE/NATURE OF THREAT 
I 
Prodromal Stage Acute 
Stage 
Chronic Stage 
Crisis Resolution 
Threat to 
Life 
23 
154). Thus, the idea behind the CSC incorporates the premise of LOC, internal and external 
control centers, and Helsel's idea that internal and external do not mean personal control 
influences, but different control environments which interact with one another in a crisis 
situation. So for the purpose of this model, the CSC (y-axis) acts to offer a range to identify 
the center of control in any situation. The control center has two components, an internal 
CSC and an external CSC. The internal CSC gradually diminishes up the continuum of the 
y-axis. In contrast, the external CSC increases up the y-axis. Obviously, external increases
as internal decreases. The CSC's are presented separately however, to suggest the different 
participants in a crisis. Lagadec and Littlejohn suggest the utility of this double focus. In his 
description of the duality of crisis, Lagadec suggests that "crisis is fueled by internal energy 
but the reality of the situation is created by outside forces" (Lagadec 21). Similarly, 
Littlejohn notes that crisis "gains meaning through the individual needs of an organization and 
the environment in which the organization exists" (Littlejohn 8). These ideologies 
demonstrate the interaction of the internal and external environments which the Trudel model 
depicts. This suggests then, that a crisis is determined by the perspectives of the individuals 
involved, specifically, the individuals of an organization involved in the crisis and those 
individuals and groups of the organization ·s environment. These ideas thus form the ground 
for the creation of the continuum on the y-axis of the new index. 
The Degree/Nature of Threat on the x-axis measures the threat to normalcy/stasis 
ranging to a threat to life. Similar to the depiction of categories in the Helsel model, these 
categories which set constraints on the beginning and the end of a situation have unclear 
boundaries as well as unclear middle ground. The Degree/Nature of Threat relates to the 
stages of crisis, prodromaJ, acute. chronic, and resolution. with connections drawn between 
the conventional incident and prodromal stage. On this x-axis we omit normalcy, and note 
the distinction between a conventional incident and a crisis. 
2-1 
This model is intended for use in two capacities, understanding the implications and 
circumstances of one crisis and evaluating several crisis. First, the model allows the user to 
categorize the perceptions and involvement of one crisis and to understand the relationships 
between the parties involved. This capacity of the model considers the dynamic nature of a 
conventional incident or crisis and allows the user to plot the movement as crisis progresses 
or as relationships between entities involved become interdependent. [Figure 5] Because the 
severity of crisis is lesser with an internal CSC, the idea this index promotes is the reduction 
of the external CSC and in tum the threat to life in order to make the crisis more controllable 
and to bring it back down into the realm of a conventional incident. To accomplish this 
intent, the index facilitates the use of external factors to help refocus the CSC internally or to 
show how the whole thing becomes uncontrollable. 
The second way to use this model is to plot the relationships of several crisis. 
[Figure 4] Here however a spiral is used instead of a point to mark the situation's place on 
the index. This spiral accommodates the dynamic nature of a crisis and demonstrates how the 
situation can potentially shift as the situation changes versus a plot mark which implies 
permanency. 
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AjJp/icarion of the Conceptual Framework lo the T111del Model 
The conceptual framework of this investigation is one of two constraints under which 
the Trudel model was developed. As with the Helsel model, this new scale will be analyzed 
based on these four propositions. 
Proposition ;; 1: At a basic level, it is possible to dis,;nguish between normalcy, com·enrional 
incidents, and crisis. 
The first aspect of the conceptual framework questions the Trudel model's 
acknowledgement of the differences between normalcy, conventional incidents, and crisis 
The way that the Trudel model is depicted, the x-axis, measuring the degree/nature of threat, 
assumes that a situation is in the realm of a conventional incident Normalcy is omitted from 
this diagram as it is everyday. Although we measure crisis by this model, the point at which 
a shift occurs between a critical incident and a crisis is not depicted here. It is an unknown at 
this time. The stages of crisis listed beneath the x-axis however, give an idea of how the 
stages might correlate with the degree/nature of threat, creating a guide for plotting the events 
of a situation. This is only a guide though, as the actual parallel of these two measurements 
is unknown. Thus, the Trudel model does consider the differences between normalcy and a 
conventional incident. The model however does relates an understanding of the difference 
between a conventional incident and crisis, but this difference is not depicted on the model at 
this time. 
l'roposilion !: 2: Cri -; · is perspecli1•c depenclen/ 
The second aspect of the conceptual framework, crisis is perspective dependent, 
applies to the this model. When plotting the CSC against the Degree/Nature of threat, it is 
the perspective of the model's user that determines the location of the placemarker. Thus, for 
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each user of the model, the progression of one situation may be plotted in several different 
ways. Similarly, plotting several crises would most likely produce several different 
interpretations. This ability to record preconceptions a strength of this model as So, although 
the importance of perception is not stated on the model, it is an integral aspect of the Trudel 
model. 
Proposition �3: Crisfa· has hnth positive and negative connotations. 
The next test of the Trudel model is its accommodation of both positive and negative 
connotations of crisis. This model facilitates this aspect of the conceptual framework as it 
places no restrictions on either viewpoint. Unlike the Helsel model which measures the 
Degree of Actual/Potential Negativity, the x-axis of the Trudel model measures the 
Degree/Nature of Threat to any situation. This measurement looks at what could occur, but 
the events themselves dictate where they fall on the continuum. Thus, this model allows for 
an event to conclude under positive circumstances, but holds no restrictions for those which 
are negative. 
Propo.\·ition !: -I: Crixis m:c:urs in distinguishahle stages. 
Finally, this model can be examined in light of the fourth proposition: crisis occurs in 
distinguishable stages. This application of the conceptual framework to the Trudel model 
brings to light two weakness of this model, specifically in the description of the x-axis. First, 
a correlation is implied between the stages of crisis and the measured range of the x-axis. 
However, because this index measures the activity of a crisis, the chronic stage cannot be 
measured on this graph by location in the same manner in which the prodromal or acute stage 
can be marked. The second weakness of this model is its inability to assume that the acute 
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stage of a crisis is the circumstance which bridges the gap between a conventional incident 
and a crisis. To address these deficiencies of the index, the stages of crisis are drawn paraHel 
to the x-axis on the index. The notation of these stages attempts to show the correlation 
between these two categorizations, but demonstrates their incompatibility 
These correlation of these four propositions to the Trudel model il1ustrates the role 
which this conceptual framework played in the model's development. Although the model 
can not support every aspect of the framework, these weaknesses are acknowledged and 
recognized as a future area for the model's improvement. 
TRUDEL MODEL APPLICATION 
To provide a more comprehensive understanding of the Trudel model, the following 
case, originally plotted on the "Scale of Crisis Magnitude, will be applied to the Trudel 
model and the thought process behind this application explained. 
Cose. Aflirn S1a1c Corrcdionaf Fac:ilily 
The Attica State Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison located in upstate 
New York. became the center of the nation's focus in the fall of I 971. Through a series of 
circumstances and actions by authorities and inmates from July through September, a crisis 
occurred resulting in 39 deaths and 91 woundings (Wicker 314). 
In July 1971 New York's Commissioner of Correctional Services, Russell G. Oswald 
received a petition from the "Attica Liberation Faction," a group of inmates claiming brutal 
and dehumanizing conditions at the state facility (6). Already concerned about tight budgets 
and prison unrest in Attica and other facilities, this correspondence by the convicts began a 
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futile exchange of letters between Oswald and the faction (6) confirming the fears of Oswald 
and Attica prison authorities which increased over the next several months. The fruitlessness 
of the inmates' efforts in their appeal to prison authorities, was confirmed in their minds again 
in early September when Oswald, Attica's Superintendent, Mancusi, and a prisoner 
representative met to discuss issues from the Liberation Faction's petition. The negotiation 
resulted in promised changes by Oswald, but again no action was seen (311 ). In retrospect, 
the interactions between authorities and inmates functioned to build tension and unrest 
between the two groups and established a common ground on which the inmates united. 
The build up of tension among the inmates in Attica increased in September 1971. 
Late on a Wednesday afternoon, a guard misperceived the interaction of two inmates during 
recreation time, leading to physical defiance to the guards by both inmates (Clines I). The 
guards, who retreated at the time, retaliated later in the evening under the direction of 
Mancusi, by beating the prisoners and placing them in solital)' confinement (Wicker 311 ). 
Enraged by the perceived injustice to their comrades the night before, the A block prisoners 
liberated a third prisoner involved in the preceding day's events on their way to breakfast 
early Thursday morning. Finding the inmate gone, the authorities approached the line of 
prisoners on the way back from the meal. ln the ensuing struggle, the Lieutenant in charge 
was knocked unconscious and the others guards with the inmates were beaten and their keys 
taken (31 I). The rebellion snowballed from this scene with the inmates taking the common 
area between the four blocks, the result of a defective lock. The rebellions's participants then 
spread through the rest of the prison, taking fifty hostages (311 ). By early afternoon, prison 
authorities were able to regain control of part of the prison, but the convicts had control of 
most of the prison's resources. An initial attempt by the inmates toward negotiation was 
rejected by Mancusi (312). 
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Leadership quickly formed among the ranks of the inmates as blocks nominated 
leaders, hostages were assigned inmate guards, lookouts were chosen and placed, food and 
clean-up details were organized, and a negotiating committee was nominated. (312). These 
actions formed a "rough social order" under which the inmates were to function for the next 
several days (Clines 44). 
In the opposite camp, the authorities organized their resources as well. Commissioner 
Oswald arrived at Attica around 2:00pm the same afternoon, and soon thereafter allowed a 
law professor and a black Buffalo assemblyman into negotiations with the inmates. There the 
men received the demands of the prisoners and a list of observers requested to be present at 
the negotiations. ( 44) The purpose of these observers was to lend outside support to the 
prisoners' requests by individuals including Huey P. Nev,/ton of the Black Panthers, Minister 
Louis Farrakhan of the Muslim Mosque in Harlem, William M. Kunstler a civil rights lawyer, 
and media groups (44). No concessions were made by either party toward negotiation. 
Further rounds of negotiation between the authorities and the inmates continued through the 
day, attended by different members of the administration and media sources. The results of 
these talks were concessions granted to the inmates by Oswald and an injunction against 
administrative and physical reprisals which was presented to the inmates on Friday morning 
(Wicker 312). However, the inmates refused the injunction, claiming that it was inadequate 
for their needs (Clines 44). Learning of this response, Oswald refused any further direct 
contact with the inmates. 
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Throughout the remainder of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday the relations between the 
administration and the inmates continued with little change. Observers checked the status of 
the hostages on occasion and the administration continued to work on meeting the demands of 
the inmates referred to as the 28 Points. In addition, they attempted to influence Governor 
Rockefeller's aid. present at the prison, to advise him to come to Attica (Wicker 313). These 
appeals were repeated throughout the day Sunday until Rockefeller made a public refusal. 
Finally, the 28 point proposal was presented to the inmates on Saturday evening. They again 
rejected the efforts of the authorities. This rejection of the 28 points by the inmates signaled 
the end of peaceful efforts by authorities. State police marksmen and attack units then 
assembled in the controlled blocks positioning for attack. At the shut-off of power and the 
use of gas on the prisoners, marksmen fired and the attack began (314). Several minutes later 
the attacks stopped. The results of the confrontation yielded 39 deaths and 91 wounded. Ten 
hostages and 29 inmates were killed by the authorities in the attack, while only two hostages 
were seriously injured by the inmates. 
Analysis 
On Helsel's "Scale of Crisis Magnitude," the events of the Attica State Correctional 
Facility were classified as a Type IV crisis, plotting the event between a regional and a 
national level, y-axis against death, x-axis. As the Helsel model was proved inaccurate and 
unusable in this investigation, Attica will be measured on the Trudel model in order to 
understand how these events progressed, culminated, and resolved. To accomplish this intent, 
this event will be indexed in both capacities of the Trudel model: that which allows 
understanding the implications and circumstances of one crisis and that which plots several 
crises for comparison. 32.
Using the model to measure a single crisis, the events of this rebellion have been 
broken down into nine facets, or things which impact the progression of events in this 
situation. They are represented by X0 through X� on the Trudel model. [Figure �] For the 
purpose of clarity, these facets will be explained in terms of the event(s) they represent and in 
terms of their positioning on the model. Also, positions of the points will sometimes be 
expressed as a percentage of a distance in order to give a point of reference for the reader. 
X0 represents the starting point for the activity at Attica on the Trudel model. This 
point does not represent Attica in stasis because normalcy is omitted in the measurement of 
the x-axis on this model. Thus, unrest is occurring in the prison at this time. On the model, 
X., is located approximately 25% up the y-axis and approximately 25¾ up the x-axis. They­
axis location, demonstrating a large internal CSC and a very small external CSC, illustrates 
that the inmate unrest is under the control of Attica prison authorities, with little or no 
external intervention. The x-axis position of this point shows that this situation is a threat to 
stasis, but that is still in the stages of a conventional incident. The X1 , position shifts 
however with the involvement of a control source, external to the Attica community, in the 
prison environment. The result of this shift is position X 1• 
Unhappy in their circumstances, a group of Attica inmates calling themselves the 
''Attica Liberation Faction" sent a petition to Commissioner Oswald. The prisoners are 
unhappy with conditions and treatment. They feel that the prison is overcrowded and that 
facilities are inadequate. With the appeal to New York's Commissioner of Correctional 
Services, Oswald, the prisoners introduce the external influence of Oswald into their situation 
which continues through a time period of fruitless correspondence. On the model, X 1 is 
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Jff 
located above X0 about two-thirds of the way up the y-axis and approximately 30% along the 
x-axis. The y-axis position, demonstrating a moderate external CSC and a smaller internal
CSC, illustrates the increased external influence in this situation. As the Commissioner of 
Correctional Services for the state of New York, Oswald has a large amount of power over 
Attica. Thus, the prisoners are appealing to this external influence on their current 
circumstances to produce positive results. The x-axis location for this point shifts right from 
the X0 position. This occurs because the appeals and ensuing correspondence with Oswald by 
the inmates increases the concerns of the administrators, and produces increasing tensions 
between the authorities and the inmates as changes do not result from the inmates' appeals. 
The balance of control centers and the nature of threat shifts again, moving from the 
X I to the X� position as a misunderstanding by a prison guard results in defiance of authority 
by inmates. Specifically, the inmate applied physical force against the guard which was 
quelled at the moment and dealt with later that evening. This contained rebellion by the 
inmates functioned to widen the gap between the guards and the inmates. X: is positioned 
about I oo,� of the way up the y-axis and approximately half way along the x-axis. This 
position is down and right of the X 1 position. The y-axis coordinate possesses a strong 
internal CSC and a weak external CSC. This occurs as this incident is solely between 
members of the Attica community; it is internal to the prison. Oswald, although a player in 
the agitation of the inmates, has no role in these events. The x-axis coordinate is again 
located to the right of the X 1 position. The increased assertiveness of the inmates, shows 
their increased agitation, heightening the degree/nature of threat to the situation. 
With the increased tension on both sides, the next positional shift in this situation 
occurs as the inmates overpower the guards accompanying them from the mess to the cell 
Jo 
block. This incident, represented by the shift from X2 to X3 , sparks the actions of the 
inmates to spread throughout the rest of the cell blocks, overpowering the prison_ In this 
chaos, the inmates take fifty hostages. On the model, X, is located approximately 10%) of the 
way up the y-axis, and three-fourths of the way along the x-axis. Like the X: y-coordinate, 
the X 3 point has a high internal CSC and a low external CSC. This again derives from the 
internal nature of the revolt; it involved only Attica authorities and inmates. The x-axis 
similarly, again shifts right. This shift occurs as the actions on the part of the guards and the 
inmates escalated to unchecked violence. The inmates knocked the Lieutenant in charge 
unconscious, and beat the other guards with them and took their keys In addition, hostages 
were taken. Both of these incidents pose a severe threat to life. 
Having passed the point of a conventional incident at a point during the last three 
shifts, the activity at Attica is now in a crisis state. A shift occurs in this state as Oswald 
once again exerts control over the situation at Attica. This moves the focus of the events 
from a position at X 1 to one at X4_ On the model, X4 locates approximately two-thirds up the 
y-axis and three-fourths along the x-axis_ This is a movement directly upward from X,,
signifying the increase in external CSC and the decrease in internal CSC. The significance of 
this y-axis vertical shift is that it is at this point that negotiation begins between the 
authorities and the inmates Previously, Mancusi, Attica's Superintendent, had rejected efforts 
by the inmates to negotiate. Oswald, however not only proceeded to communicate, but sent 
in a law Professor and a Buffalo assemblyman. Thus, the threat to 1 ife, x-axis, does not 
change, but the involvement of external forces on internal controls. 
An upward shift occurs again with no horizontal movement with the inclusion of 
media and observers in the authority/inmate negotiations. These involvements move X4 to the 
X5 position on the model. This coordinate shows a very high external CSC on the y•axis. 
The y•axis position illustrates the Attica scenario here as the negotiations with the inmates are 
primarily facilitated by Oswald. At this point in negotiation, the authorities have received the 
demands of the convicts which include a request for a specific list of observers to be present. 
In addition to the media. these observers are a means through which the inmates hope to gain 
validity for their claims and a positive change to their environment. Both of these groups are 
forces outside of Attica, and thus external CSCs. As before though, the x•axis coordinate 
does not shift as no means are reached to reduce the threat to life. These factors then define 
the vertical but not horizontal movement. 
The X_, position again shifts vertically, as yet another external factor is added to this 
situation. This external intervention occurs though the appeal by the observers to the 
governor of the state of New York, Governor Rockefeller. Although intervention by 
Rockefeller in the Attica scenario does not occur, the active appeal of the observers and 
Rockefeller's aids to him signifies the level of external influence that Attica officials felt 
necessary in order to control the inmate rebellion. On the model, the appeal to Rockefeller 
moves the focus of control from position X, to X r,· X., locates where the y•axis is at its 
highest degree of external CSC and at the lowest internal CSC and where the x•axis position 
is again three.fourths down the x•axis. As before, the high degree of CSC does not reduce 
the nature of threat in this situation, which is a serious threat to life. 
Because intervention by external forces failed to produce the positive results which 
both the inmates and authorities of Attica anticipated, the authorities of Attica, in 
collaboration with external factions, act against the inmates to end the rebellion. These 
actions move the focus on the model from the X <, location to the X 7 point, down and right of 
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X6. This repositions the y-axis coordinate at a position approximately two-thirds of the way 
up the continuum where the external CSC still exceeds the internal CSC. The x-axis 
coordinate extends to the end of the continuum as loss of life occurs. In this move, the 
authorities retake Attica by force with loss of life to both inmates and hostages. Both Attica 
authorities and external factions, including Oswald, participated in the decision for this action. 
Finally, the focal point shifts back to the X0 position described as X$ . Here the actions 
experienced in X7 put the center of control back into internal control and reduce the threat to 
life back to a threat to normalcy/stasis. Complete normalcy is not yet restored here as the 
consequences of the actions for the prisoners are not resolved. 
The second capacity of the Trudel model is to show relationships of several crises. In 
this instance, only Attica will be plotted on the model, but the point which the Attica riots 
represent, demonstrates a different analysis process from the above application. 
To plot Attica as one dynamic point on the Trudel model requires two considerations; 
where does the overall situation fall on the CSC continuum and what is the overall 
Degree/Nature of Threat for the situation. To determine Attica's CSC, the amount of external 
CSC versus internal CSC was examined. In this situation, external influence played a vital 
role m this situation, through appeals by the inmates and negotiation intervention. Oppositely, 
internal inf1 uences contributed largely to the actual riots in the prison because of adverse 
living conditions. Considering these factors, Attica places approximately two-thirds up along 
the y-axis. [Figure 6] This placement allows for the influence of both parties, but a stronger 
external CSC. 
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Deciding the x-axis coordinate requires similar consideration. From the beginning of 
the inmates' appeal to Commissioner Oswald, the Attica environment deviated from stasis, 
placing the situation on the left end of the continuum. The ensuing events created a larger 
and larger threat to the lives of parties involved including hostages, inmates, and other 
authorities. Therefore, because the threat to life and eventual !oss of life plays a primary role 
in this situation, the x-axis coordinate ultimately places at the far right end of the continuum. 
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Surrounding the Attica plot on the model is a spiral. This spiral represents the 
dynamic nature of this occurrence. Thus, the point of location for Attica on the graph is not a 
fixed position, but a spot which approximates the area most suited for this situation. 
The implications of the Trudel model for the field of Leadership Studies, is to provide 
an instrument in which leaders can understand a situation in order to take proactive measures 
to control it. For example, in the Attica Case if authorities could have plotted the events of 
the riots on a scale such as the Trudel model, they would have seen that their actions were 
pushing the inmates away from the desired internal focus (y-axis), and normalcy (x-axis). 
Seeing where events stood versus where they intended them to be would allow leaders to take 
actions to move events out of crisis situations back into a state of stasis. This use might have 
produced more proactive leadership by Attica authorities, changing the ultimate outcome of 
the situation. 
CONCLUSION 
Crisis is a dynamic phenomenon which exists throughout our societies and enters into 
many facets of our lives. Often times, leaders arise out of these crisis states, directing us 
'lo 
though periods of threat, discomfort, and change. Surprisingly, research for this field does not 
directly parallel the seemingly large occurrence of these events in our environments. Because 
of this limited scope of research and the large scale of occurrence, this examination was 
undertaken to broaden our knowledge of crisis and to understand the impact that this 
phenomenon makes on leadership studies 
To accomplish this intent, this investigation evaluated one aspect of crisis study, the 
Helsel "Scale of Crisis Magnitude." This model compared the actual/potential number of 
persons affected by a crisis situation to the degree of actual or potential negativity of a 
situation. Through testing by two means, an internal evaluation comparing the visual 
depiction to the written explanation, and an external evaluation comparing the conceptual 
framework to the model, Helsel's model was found inaccurate and unusable. However, data 
from this analysis as well as the conceptual framework, provided the groundwork and 
ideology on which the Trudel model is based. This model is intended for use i.n all fields and 
by all people through its simplicity and ability to span contexts. Ideally, it can encompass 
personal crisis ranging to organizational and world crisis 
In addition to differences in structure and specific measurements, a main difference 
between the Helsel and Trudel models is the use of perspective For the Trudel model, 
perspective is a strength. In one capacity, for example, a leader can apply the model to their 
own situation. In addition, an outside force (i.e. a consultant) can apply the model to the 
same events. Comparing the two situational measurements allows the leader to understand 
not only what is happening or potentially happening with the situation, but how this event is 
viewed externally. Proactive measure can then be taken to improve upon the situation. Thus, 
for the Trudel model, perspective plays a vital role for both leadership and crisis research 
functions. 
Ideally. the Trudel model requires testing by several other examples, or by the plotting 
of the same example by several different individuals due to its dynamic nature and its 
dependency on perspective. This testing would demonstrate the feasibility of this model in an 
actual crisis situation. However, at this time, new proposals have been made which change 
the structure and to some degree the measurements of this index. Specifically, it is under 
determination whether the index should have four axis (top, bottom, left, and right). The right 
axis would measure the CSC of the environmental factors of the crisis. The top axis would 
tentatively measure the stages of crisis. Also suggested, are the addition of point of reference 
guidelines along each axis of the current model (i.e. degree markers ranging from one to ten) 
to expedite and simplify the designation of coordinates. Because of the uncertainty of these 
measurements, and the implications of these changes on the current model, these 
modifications and thus testing will await further research. 
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APPENDICES 
Chronology of Events 
Tu/y, 1971 Commissioner Oswald receives petition from Attica Liber­
ation Faction. 
;at., Aug. 21 George J:ickson dies, supposedly shot while attempting 
esc:ipe f rorn San Quentin prison. 
mt., Aug. :n Anica inmates fost and hold a silent protest at breakfast. 
'hurs., Sept. � Oswald confers with Attica Superintendent l\1a11cc:i 
and prisoner representative Lott over July petition. In a tape­
recorded message to the inmatest Oswald promises that changes 
will be made evenruallv. 
'ed., Se pt. 8 
45 P • .\1. Inmates Dew·er and Lamorie defv Corrections Officer 
J\fr1ronc,· and are ordered to solitary confinement in Housing 
BlockZ: 
0TF.R m;,;;,;rn \Vhen Dewer and Lamorie are taken to HBZ Cor­
rections Officer Bo�·le is hit in the face with a soup can reputedly 
thrown by \Villiam Ortiz. 
•urs., Sept. 9
o .',.,.\!. Ortiz is liberated from his cell by other inmates to go to
breakfast.
During breakfast, authorities discover that Ortiz is absent from 
his cell. Five Company is ordered back to its cells. 
5 A.M. Lr. Curtiss approaches Five Company in A-tunnel to effect 
this. Curtiss is knocked unconscious and other guards are beaten, 
their keys taken. The intraprison phone is ripped from the wall. 
A,M. A defective bolt in the gate at Times Square gives way 
under the pressure of a group of inmate<; and the rebellion 
spreads through the prison. Quinn, the guard on duty there, 
sustains serious skull fractures. Fifty hostages are taken. 
MORNZ'.':G Hostages a.re protected, in particular by Black Mus­
lims. Roger Champen begins to organize inmates in D-yard. 
Appendix A 
] 1 2  Chronology of Events 
EARLY AFTERNOON Authorities regain control of pa rt  of the prison. 
Mancusi alienates inmates in a negotiation attempt at No Man's 
Land. 
Inmates appoint lookouts and guards for hostages, ration cap­
ttJCed food, organize clean-up detai ls, and nominate a negotia­
_ting team. 
2 : 00  P.M. Commissioner Oswald arrives at Attica. 
3 : 00, P�M. Schwartz and New York State Assemblyman Eve arrive
in D-yard and are presented with the Five Demands and a list 
of persons to he invited as observers of the negotiations. 
4: 45-5 : r 5  P.M. Oswald, Schwartz, and Eve confer with inmates in 
D-yard. 
Oswald is advised by state police that sufficient force is present 
to retake the institution. 
5 :45-6 :44 P.M. Oswald returns to D-yard with New York Times, 
Buffalo newspaper, radio, and TV reporters. Inmates present the 
Fifteen Practical Propo'.:als. 
7: 30 P.M. Assistant CommissiJner Dunbar, Assemblyman Emery, Eve, 
and Schwartz enter D-yard and are asked for a federal  court 
inj unction against administrative and physic:1l repris:1 ls. 
Champen, Oswald, and Schwartz draft the inj unction outside 
of 0-yard. 
r r : 30 P.M. Schwartz leaves to ohtain injunction. 
Fri., Sept. 1 0
8:  3 0  A.M. Schwartz returns with the inj unction from Federal Judge 
Curtin.  It is rejected by inmates. 
1 1 :  2 5 A.M. Oswald enters D-yard. 1hc in junction is rorn np by 
Rosenberg. Oswald decides that he wi l l  110 longer negotiate 
directly with the rebell ing inmates. 
LATE AFTERNOON Observers contact D.A. J:tmcs but fa i l  to obtain 
amnesty gu:1rantee. 
EVENING Observers enter D-yard and inspect hostages. 
At inmates' request, some observers inspect C-hlock. 
Kunstler arrives in the Stewards' Room and telephones Bobby 
Seale of the Black Panther Party. 
1 1 : 30 P.M. Observer� again enter D-yard. Inmates add dcm.rnds that 
Mancusi and D r. Williams be expelled from the Attica staff. 
LATER Unexplained noise from C-block prompts fear of attack :1ml 
"red alert" in D-yard. Eve and Dunne ascertain that no repris:ils 
are taking place and return to D-yard with members of the 
Fortune Society, Ingram, and Kenyatta. 
Cbronology of Eve11ts 3 13 
Sat., Sept. 1 1
4: 30 A . .  , 1 .  Observers leave D-vard. 
The observers choose a� executive comm ittee from among their
numher. 
\Vicker, Jones, :md Tepper visi t D.A. James in \Varsaw in :in 
attempt to obta in  something similar to nmncsty for the inmates. 
ro : oo A.,",J : James. gi':es_ 
them a statement that there· will be no prose­
cutmns or v111d1ct1vc reprisals. 
1 1  : oo  A.M. Observers who have left the prison have difficulty bei ng 
readmitted. 
I : oo P.M. Observers meet again. James' letter is not well  received. 
\\'ic�er proposes that the executive committee should arrempt 
to winnow down the inmates' demands and that all others leave. 
On l v  si -.:: others leave, and thev :1re Jocked out. 
4 :  30 P. M. · Corrections Officer Qui�n dies. 
Observers finish 2 8-point p:1cbge and decide to wait for Scale 
before presenting it to the inmates. 
6: 30 J>. 1, 1 .  Sca le sits in  :1 c:ir  outside the prison for an hour and then 
leaves, while Oswald and observers discuss h is admitta nce. State 
police :i re sent ,1 ftcr h im to rcci uest his presence. 
8 :  30 P.J\t . SeJ lc enters the Stewards' Room and refuses to endorse the 
28  poi nts. Observers enter D-�·:1rd ro present the z8 point�. Some 
observers leave u pon present ing the sheet of pa per, but others, 
upon seeing the inmates' :rngcr, make the decision to present the 
points ora l ly . 
The 28  points arc ripped up. Remaining observers leave. 
Stm., Scpt. 1 2
J\ l oH N I N( ;  ,voman Jll;maging :1 d i ner hecomcs hrstcrical over the 
presence of A rthur  l •�vc. 
H: 30 A . /\1 .  Scale a rri ves at Attica. Observers group again in Stewa rds' 
Rorn n .  Se:1 k w:i l l, s  out. 
r o: 50 A . \ 1 . The ol isc rn:rs trv to infl uence Governor Rockefeller's 
rl" prcscnr:n i vcs ro ·ad v ist' ·h im to come ro Att ica . 
1 1 : 4 5  A . /1. 1 .  The observers dr:1 ft am! complete a statcmcm to the puhlic. 
1 :  1 1  l'. M .  Oswald agree, rh :i t  observers may enter D-ya nl at 3 : 00. 
Observers rc l cphorH: l {ur.:kddlcr themselves, trying without 
sm-ces� to pnsu:1dc h im t o  come to meet w ith them. 
3 :45 l'./1.L A smal l  grou p of oh�r.:rvers enters D-y�r<l, fol lowed later by 
hLi d: :m d Puerto Ricm me<l i :1  representatives. Hostages are 
i nterv iewed . 
I n mates o flici:i l l_\· rci cct the � 8  points. Tile_,, lc.1ve the next move
up to the cmrnnissioner. 
J14 Chronolo!{y of Eve7lts 
6: 17 P.M. Observers leave D-yard for the last time. 
Rockefeller states publicly rliar he wilJ not come to Attica. 
9: 26 P.M. Oswald meets with the observers, who plead for more
tirne. 
ro: 35 P.�t. !he meeting breaks up. Nine observers agree to spend the 
mght 10 the Stewards' Room. 
MmNIG�T Oswald phones Rockefeller in a last attempt to persuade
him to come. 
Mon., Sept. 13
6: 5 5 A.M. Observers learn that Oswald has broken contact with them. 
8:oo A.M. Oswald presents inmate Clark with a final statement of his 
position. 
8: 30 A.M. Observers read a copy of Oswald's memorandum to Clark. 
lnmates staU for time. 
State police marksmen assemble unseen on the roofs and third 
floors of A- and C-blocks. 
Attack units assemble on first and second floors of A- and 
C-blocks.
9:05 A,M
.' 
Hostages are seen being led blindfolded to a walkway near 
Times Square, knives at their throats. 
9: 30 A.M. Inmates' response to 28 pojnrs is negative. 
Eleven 
_
corre�tions officers with weapons gather, ignorant of
orders, m a third-floor corridor. 
9:43 A.M. The prison's power circuit is mrned off. A hclicopcer drops 
CS ga� �n D-yard. Marksmen fire and attack begins.
9: 52 A.M. Fmng stops. 
1 o: JO A.M. D- and C-blocks are cleared. 
1 :40 P.M. Badillo, Eve, and Garcia are told by Oswald that, as elected 
officials, they will be given a tour of the institution. All other 
observers are requested to leave. 
Afterwards The results of the carnage are tabulated and it becomes 
known that two hostages were seriously injured by the inmates, 
wl�ereas JO hostages and 29 inmates were killed by corrcctir-ns
officers and state troopers. Three hostages, 85 jnmates, and one 
trooper were wounded. 
l 
! 
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APPENDIX ONE - -
The Five Demands 
To the people of America 
The incident that has erupted here at Attica is not a result of 
the dasrnrdly husbwacking of the two prisoners Sept. 8, 197 r bur of
the unmitigated oppression wrought by the racist administration net­
work of the prison, thruughout the year.
WE. arc l\lEN! \Ve are nor beasrs :1nd do not intend to he
beaten or driven ;1s such. The entire prison populace has set forrh to
change forever the ruthless l>ruralization and disregard for the lives of
the prisoners here and throughout the United States. \Vhat has hap­
pened here is but the sotmd before the fury of those who arc oppressed.
We will nor compromise on any terms except those that are
agreeable to us. \Ve c:1II upon all the conscientious citizens of America
to assist us in putting :m end to this situation that threatens the lives
 of
nor only us, hut c:1ch and everyone of us as well. 
\Ve h:1ve set forth demands that will bring closer ro reality
the demise of rhcsr prisons institutions that serve no usdul purpo
se to
the People of l\ 1 mricn, but to those who would cnshtvc and c:--plo
it 
the people of J\1m:rica. 
OUR 1)/:',lfANDS AIW SUCIJ:
1. \Ve w:inr complcrc :mmcsty, mc:rning freedom from any
physical, mcnt,11 and legal reprisals.
2. \Ve want rmw, speedy :ind s:1fo transportation out of con
­
lincmcm, to a non-imperialistic country.
3. \Ve drnuu(l rh:ir rhc FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
inrer­
vc11c, so rhat we will lie under dirc<:t FEDERAL
 JURIS-
DICTION. 
